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1. Introduction
Cities survive earthquakes and rebuild with improved urban strategies, architectural de‐
signs and building technologies. This chapter will present a detailed analysis of the re‐
sponse, recovery, planning and rebuilding processes after the Lisbon earthquake and
compare them to the recent events in Christchurch, New Zealand. Archival research from
libraries and museums in Portugal will inform the historical analysis, and interviews and of‐
ficial documents from New Zealand relief and reconstruction agencies will underpin the
contemporary analysis. The study aims to identify opportunities and challenges in facilitat‐
ing good urban design in the process of recovering from a natural disaster, using case stud‐
ies which are separated by over 250 years, but which both attest to the centrality of urban
design in the reconstruction process.
2. Lisbon 1755
This section will look at the Lisbon earthquake and its aftermath, with a view to understand‐
ing how design, leadership and governance processes contributed to the production of an
18th century, state-of-the-art urban quarter in the wake of a national tragedy. Particular at‐
tention will be paid to the coincidence of enlightened political, economic and technical skills
which were judiciously applied to the re-planning of the city. By many counts the thinking
was modern, and bears a worthwhile comparison to the recent seismic events in Christ‐
church, which will be the subject of the second part of the chapter.
© 2013 Brand and Nicholson; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
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3. The event
An estimated 8.4 magnitude earthquake in Lisbon on the morning of All Saints’ Day in 1755
reverberated throughout the Iberian Peninsula, Madeira, the Azores, and North Africa. Tsu‐
namis affected the Caribbean and the Atlantic coasts of Europe [1]. Of a population of
250,000, up to 20,000 people perished in the quake, tsunami and fires that followed [2]:
At this moment the earth shook, the sea rose up foaming in the harbour and dashed to
pieces the ships lying at anchor. The streets and squares were filled with whirling masses of
flame and cinders. The houses collapsed the roofs crashing down on shattered foundations.
Thirty thousand inhabitants were crushed beneath the ruins [3]
.
Aid came from Portugal's colonies and her allies and trading partners England, Germany
and Holland. Strategically, local merchants donated a 4% surcharge on imports to the relief
effort which gave them critical political influence in determining new land uses for the re‐
construction [4].
Figure 1. Panoramas of Lisbon before the 1755 earthquake [various authors] Museu da Cidade de Lisboa
4. Recovery: A vision of economic and political reform
The man in charge of the reconstruction effort, the Minister of State (1756-1777), Sebastião
José de Carvalho e Melo, was decisive and commanding in his response to the disaster, relief
and the forward planning of the city and his leadership in the crisis cemented his political
power over his adversaries until the death of his supporter King José I in 1777. The King
would make him the Marquis of Pombal 15 years after the earthquake in recognition of his
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leadership during the crisis. In a swift and articulate response to the emergency, the city was
immediately surveyed and new construction was prohibited. Looters were publicly hung
and able-bodied deserters were prevented from leaving the city and pressed into relief work
by the army. Monasteries and public squares were filled with the homeless, and tent cities
occupied by merchants and nobles sprouted (King José I and his family occupied an exten‐
sive tent and pavilion court in the hills of Ajúda at the edge of Lisbon for some months after
the earthquake). Pombal moved about the city directing the recovery operation from his mo‐
bile headquarters a carriage which he had commandeered from the royal family.
What followed in the next two years was the ruthless and all-encompassing implementation
of a radical plan which would change the political landscape and dramatically improve Por‐
tugal’s economic position in Europe. The Terreiro do Paço (Figure 1) or Palace Square, had
evolved as an elongated, spatially contained, urban space at the edge of the Tagus River in
association with the Ribeiro Palace. In the wake of the earthquake the space was reconfig‐
ured, along with the adjacent central Baixa district, as the Praça do Comércio, a formal axial
square surrounded by monumental public edifices where the business of an empire could be
effectively conducted.
Pombal’s previous roles as political envoy to London and Vienna and Minister of Foreign
Affairs and War (1750-1756), where he oversaw town planting in Brazil, had seen him devel‐
op sophisticated ideas on mercantilist economic reform and coherent town planning. In the
reconstruction of Lisbon’s heart he found the perfect vehicle for both. The aim was to create
a modern political centre where commerce could thrive. He had, in his ministerial role, over‐
seen the dismantling of the Portuguese inquisition, the secularisation of education, and the
nationalisation of industry [5]. He therefore favoured an institutional shift away from the
old nobility (whom he considered corrupt and impractical) and the Jesuits, to the city's com‐
mercial elites who had helped finance the reconstruction. A strategically timed and imple‐
mented legal re-configuration of property ownership in the Baixa, transferred land from the
aristocracy and ecclesiastic authorities to emerging merchant elites, whose collective eco‐
nomic enterprise would eventually succeed in rebuilding Portugal’s indigenous economy.
The waterfront square was edged with public buildings, which encompassed business, city
government, and customs and exchange, in an effort to stimulate local trade and industry,
and reverse high local unemployment levels and the traditional dominance of foreign mer‐
chants.
Urban renewal in the aftermath of the earthquake was appropriate for other reasons. Portu‐
gal had entered an era of nation-building with the consolidation of her borders in in 13th and
14th centuries. By the 16th century, Lisbon’s image and role as the capital of a nation and a
vast empire stretching from Angola to Macau was considered important, and urban embel‐
lishment was funded by gold and diamonds from Brazil. During the reign of King João V
significant new urban projects were planned in the west of the city to boost the capital’s sta‐
tus. The Águas Livres Aquaduct in 1728 is the best example of a new project that combined
the provision of infrastructure with urban-scaled monumentality. Other projects included
the construction of the vast and extravagant convent -palace at Mafra, the interior embellish‐
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ment of 65 medieval and baroque churches and the building of dozens of new places of wor‐
ship in the neoclassical style.
More significantly, Enlightenment-thinking from Northern Europe opened up the possibil‐
ity of a scientific explanation for disaster rather than a religious one, rendering reconstruc‐
tion  a  rational  rather  than  a  superstitious  exercise,  while  the  destruction  of  a  splendid
European court generated political uncertainties and revolutionary possibilities. As part of
the reconstruction exercise, Pombal surveyed the populace in search of technical and sci‐
entific data about the earthquake, and his findings pointed to new methods in construc‐
tion. Liquefaction had been observed in the riverside areas, so new buildings there were
constructed on timber piles driven into the soil  to act  as anti-seismic stabilisers.  Timber
buildings had survived the quake better  than masonry buildings,  so new buildings had
internal seismic frames added to their fabric. The new streets were widened so that even
if the buildings on both sides had collapsed, there would remain an evacuation passage
between them [6].
Ana Araújo [7] suggests that the press of the time stimulated a pan-European debate about
issues of pragmatic responsiveness to natural disasters and unity of action across national
borders. It was certainly the first example of a truly international relief effort after a calamity
of such magnitude. Fact and fiction merged in the minds of the populace, fuelled by exag‐
gerated emotive accounts of the catastrophe printed in cheap popular news pamphlets [8].
These served to fuel superstitious terrors, displays of religious fanaticism and dire predic‐
tions associated with natural phenomena such as Halley’s Comet which was expected to ap‐
pear in 1757 or 1758. The auto da fé, (act of faith, or public burning of heretics) held in the
Terreiro in June 1756 was devised as a collective atonement for the earthquake of the previ‐
ous year [9].
The event also presented political opportunity for the Minister of State to distribute anti-Jes‐
uit propaganda in the capitals of Europe via anonymously authored opinion pieces in major
newspapers [10]. Pombal co-opted some of the most influential men of the day in literature
and science [11] to disseminate news and views about earthquake recovery, the necessity of
repressive civil protection measures adopted post-disaster, and public health and welfare in‐
terventions. In the interests of civil obedience, state terror replaced the religious fear of the
past.
5. Experience and expertise
The group charged with the recovery and rebuilding of Lisbon were an elite cohort of mili‐
tary engineers whose routine duties involved cartography, architecture and town planning,
including the design and construction of infrastructure, (roads, aqueducts, ports, defence
structures and fortifications) and associated buildings. They were a geographically mobile
and flexible group of men, deployed in situations ranging from the frontier towns at outer
reaches of the global Portuguese empire, to its busy cosmopolitan centre of trade and com‐
merce. Their expertise embodied a high level of practical knowledge gained from work in
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the field as well as state of the art scientific knowledge. Their training via an apprenticeship
system at the University Coimbra, represented a productive intersection of the knowledge
embodied in foreign treatises such as those of Alberti and Vitruvius, and the real world they
encountered in their active service.
Their approach to the built environment appears to privilege the site-specific adaptation of
useful typologies, while giving a high priority to public space and infrastructure (especially
port infrastructure, given that so many of the Portuguese colonial settlements and feitórias
(trading posts) were coastal)[12]. Their sensitivity to the scale differential between the city and
the building via a unified architectural language is a notable aspect of the Lisbon plan. Many of
the best military personnel were in Lisbon at the time of the earthquake, and others joined them
for the special mission of rebuilding the capital. Their designs were infused with the utopian‐
ism of the Portuguese school of the rational and civic-minded town planning demonstrated in
new world cities such as Goa, Rio, Macapà and Luanda [13].
In 1910, cavalry officer Christovam Sepúlveda published Manuel da Maya e os Engenheiros
Militares Portuguêses no Terromoto de 1755 (Manuel da Maya and the Portuguese Military
Engineers in the 1755 Earthquake) [14] which identified Maia’s central role as the strategist
in the planning and rebuilding exercise. Jacôme Ratton [15] identifies military architect Eu‐
génio dos Santos as the person who formulated the principles of the reconstruction.
Sepúlveda highlights two important aspects of  the organisational  culture of  the military
engineers. The first was their adherence to hierarchy, discipline and teamwork in military
operations  and  the  second  was  the  heavy  investment  they  made  in  strategic  planning.
Maia’s role in executing both these practices is evident in the terms of reference for the re‐
construction that  were which embodied in the Dissertacão and other  critical  supporting
official documents published in the late 1750s. Manuel da Maia’s 1755 Dissertacão [16] de‐
scribes the strategic solution for the rebuilding of Lisbon after the 1755 disaster. In addi‐
tion  to  emphasising  leadership,  Sepúlveda  deemed  the  teamwork,  training  and  field
experience of this group of elite military engineers in the colonial realm as essential prep‐
aration for the task.
There was ample regional  and local  precedent  for  disaster  recovery as  earthquakes had
plagued Lisbon since its founding. A seismic event on the 26th of January 1531 had struck
the city with equal force, but produced a far less acute political reaction due to the rela‐
tive social stability at the time [17]. The Portuguese had certainly benefited from the study
of other disasters such as the 1666 fire of London and the numerous volcanic events of in
Sicily,  particularly those affecting the city of Catania.  Maia had been involved for many
years in surveying and engineering projects around Lisbon, and this formed the basis of
his  knowledge to  reconstruct  the  city.  Critically  he had been involved in  the surveying
and building of the Main Fortification Line in 1716, the Águas Livres Aquaduct, between
1720 and 1730, and the Santa Isabel survey in the 1740s. This deep knowledge of the ter‐
rain subsequently allowed him to swiftly prepare the alternative plans. He authored the
Dissertacão which described the methods and processes leading up to the publication of
the 1756 plan (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. A Topographical Plan of the city of Lisbon [Carvalho and Mardel] 1755 Museu da Cidade de Lisboa
6. Planning: The dissertacão
The town planning principles for rebuilding Lisbon were established within 5 months of the
event, in Part I of the Dissertacão, which directed that options for both rebuilding and relo‐
cating the city be considered. There was an impetus to rebuild and relocate the court in a
better place (either at Bélem or São João dos Bem-Casados) which opened up the possibility
for locating new public buildings in the Baixa. Layouts were subsequently developed by
military architects Eugénio dos Santos and Carlos Mardel.
Part ll of the Dissertacão was comprised of a legal decree in May 1756 that governed land
ownership, construction and finance for the rebuilding of the devastated centre, and a set of
development rules for areas of expansion at the periphery. Part III of the Dissertacão was
comprised of the alternative plans, which covered a range of rebuilding and relocation op‐
tions. Maia presented six options investigating variations of street widening, ground re-lev‐
elling, adjusted building heights, all contributed to a radical new block morphology,
residential-building typology (with trade and craft premises at ground level) and sense of
urban scale [18]. A prefabricated, technically innovative and stylistically simplified four-
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storey building type was developed. This building ingeniously incorporated fire walls that
extended above the roof line and earthquake resistant diagonally braced, timber load-bear‐
ing cages called gaiola that sat independently within the masonry perimeter walls. Building
components were prefabricated on a large scale off-site, allowing speedy on-site assembly
with minimal traditional craft involvement [19].
The plan ultimately chosen, incorporated the following mechanisms and characteristics
which are documented by Claudio Montiero [20]:
1. A standardised building type
2. A standardised construction solution incorporating fire separations and seismic frames
3. A rational and generous public space network based on pre-existing places
4. The use of the rubble from the ruins to raise and regularise the levels of the Baixa by 1.2
metres, and reclaim new land from the Tagus
5. A disregard of property ownership boundaries (especially the location of churches) so
as not to compromise the rigorous geometry of the new plan
This formed the basis for the legal provisions of the legal decree of June 1758 which finalised
the plan. It had taken two years for the plan and the legal and financial exchanges to align.
A year later, in June 1759, re-building finally commenced.
These critical ownership reforms relied on Pombal’s public credibility and private influence
at Court. The period was dogged by multiple conspiracies, including a palace coup in 1756,
and an assassination attempt on the King in 1758. These behind-the-scenes machinations
lengthened the plan’s implementation time, but unlocked the heart of the city as a centre of
trade and commerce, thereby better serving the emerging merchant class and challenging
the historic power of nobility and clergy. The plan largely preserved the places and names
of the historic city and retained the location, hierarchy and functions of three main squares
(with the re-naming occurring later). Churches that had been free-standing were now inte‐
grated into the Baixa blocks.
The Praça do Comércio doubled the size of the former Terreiro do Paço, by reclaiming land
from the river Tagus. The new square’s symmetry, focusing on an equestrian statue (flanked
by the animals of Portugal’s far-flung continental empires), and the triumphal arch to the
main street, Rua Augusta, constituted the axis of the plan as a whole. The post-earthquake
square had a statue of King José I at its heart but perimeter uses were designated for func‐
tions of state, with the palace itself relocated to the city edge at Ajúda [21]. While symboli‐
cally, a royal statue still stood at the centre of Lisbon, functionally it was now a place for
commercial enterprise (Figure 3). Blocks were configured in a simple proportional and com‐
positional system that supported elegant and environmentally comfortable street sections
and public-space footprints. There was a hierarchy of three main streets, each 60 palms
wide, that were named for the guilds (Rua da Prata, Rua do Ouro or Silver and Gold Streets
respectively), cross streets that were named for church and parish interests, and North-
South streets, each of widths of 40 palms, that were also named for guilds.
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Figure 3. Praça do Comércio [Rick Allender] 2007
The streets determined the building fabric. The building heights were to be no higher than
the width of the streets and thus set a new standard for access to light and air in an urban
building. A system of dividing dwellings by floors, with retail at ground-level and artisans’
workshops at basement-level, was developed. The arrangement of three floors of identical
apartments plus an attic above the ground-level floor was the origin of modern mixed-fami‐
ly ownership in Portugal, and the typology represented the potential for a mixing of classes
in one edifice, each with its own separate entrance. Both shops and apartments were built to
be rented, thus facilitating urban housing as a form of property investment.
The plan’s implementation was directed by José Monteiro de Carvalho, who materialised
the abstract rules for scale and the architectural features of the urban blocks at a large scale,
while enforcing technical standards such as fire compartments between tenancies, new sew‐
er locations and the cage structures. He was also attentive to the finer details of serial design
elements required for cast-steel balconies, the ashlar masonry trim to building bases and
openings, and consistent window and door joinery profiles (Figure 4). Up to this time he
had been in charge of demolition, which earned him the nickname Bota-Abaixo or knock-it-
down.
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Figure 4. century standardised building types in Chiado District [Diane Brand] 2004
This aesthetic and technical system became the basis for re-planning Lisbon as a whole, es‐
pecially around the new palaces, and in areas developed at higher densities in the western
part of the city. The scheme set the tone for a future direction of urbanism in Lisbon that
embodied a new rational Cartesian pattern but which was firmly anchored in a traditional
morphology. Over time the plan set aesthetic, technical and legal precedents but these were
not fully appreciated until the modern era, when separate built environment professional
disciplines such as architecture and planning emerged and their histories were fully re‐
searched.
7. Rebuilding
Claudio Monteiro [22] suggests that legislative reform enacted during the reconstruction of
Lisbon was driven by the plan’s necessary transformation of the structure of urban property
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ownership, and the careful reconciling of individual rights with the security of future invest‐
ment. The reconstruction plan and the resultant legislative reform were the tools that
brought about eventual political and economic reform. Pombal’s aim was to consolidate the
power of the King while at the same time modernising the nation’s legal, economic and so‐
cial structures.
The measures used to achieve these included:
1. The surveying of existing buildings at the time of the earthquake to avoid disputes dur‐
ing reconstruction, especially when an overhaul of the land ownership arrangements
was contemplated (Wren’s plan for London after the fire in 1666 had been frustrated by
an inability to rationalise the nobility’s ownership of the large estates in central Lon‐
don).
2. A prohibition on constructing or reconstructing buildings before the plan’s approval:
a. Outside of Lisbon, to stop the city growing randomly and
b. Within Lisbon, to prevent the rebuilding of buildings partially destroyed by fire (less
than one third of the original buildings were in a habitable condition and no alternative
accommodation existed apart from tent cities and timber shacks erected in public
spaces).
The plan was approved two and a half years after the earthquake, and the first lots were re‐
constructed three and a half years later. Nevertheless, illegal urban development had
sprung up in spite of harsh enforcement of the decrees.
3. Freezing rents and freezing the price of construction materials, to combat speculation,
eviction and exploitation around the shortage of construction materials and rental ac‐
commodation. This was done by restricting any new lease agreements to perpetual
leases or long-term rental contracts.
4. Creating the conditions for legal, religious and political reform by freely compensating
and transferring pre-existing property ownerships into newly agreed formats
5. The complete demolition of the Baixa to make way for a despotic but utopian and pro‐
gressive plan [23]
8. Compensation
Land within the Baixa was immediately appropriated by the state and re-allocated, with
preference given to existing land owners, leaseholders or administrators for nobles, the
church or the crown. Compensation was based only on site area, and not the post-earth‐
quake building condition. New lots were allocated on the condition that redevelopment
would be completed within five years, effectively rendering the exercise a land re-adjust‐
ment operation rather than an exercise in eminent domain, while preventing long-term
speculation of development leap-frogging.
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Undersized lots, oversized lots and lots eliminated by the creation of new public spaces or
streets were paid fair land swap or cash compensation in proportion to the frontage width
of the site. Cash payments were necessary since there was a greater total area for public
space in the new plan and therefore an undersupply of new sites. Maia proposed a propor‐
tional reduction of all buildable areas to account for improved amenity as a result of more
public space in new areas. The chief surveyor of the inspections, Alexandre José Montanha
divided the Baixa into seven zones of value, thus setting up a financial mechanism by which
properties were exchanged or compensation calculated with a ‘premium payment’ embed‐
ded for superior sites adjacent to public space.
In  this  way  the  plan  created  value.  The  overall  effect  was  to  replace  certain  types  of
landowners (nobles and secular clergy) with merchants, sparking what Subtil called ‘po‐
litical earthquakes’ in Portuguese society [24]. The compensation system and plan stimu‐
lated investment from the business community who had financed the reconstruction (via
credit  or purchase).  This in effect led to a significant redistribution of wealth,  a consoli‐
dation of economic power among the middle class,  and a new degree of upward social
mobility.  The  move  also  unlocked  the  encumbrances  and  liens  strictures  embedded  in
the medieval  property codes that  had inhibited clean development processes within the
city.
Complete execution of the plan took over 40 years. An initial displacement of Lisbon’s pop‐
ulation to the west immediately after the earthquake inhibited the uptake of property in the
centre. The ancient elites also retreated, taking the court sector with them.
9. Authoritarian processes
Authoritarian processes were the key to the effective reconstruction of Lisbon. Pombal was
appointed by the King to his position as Minister of State and he used this mandate to cen‐
tralise political power by removing the Senate from the state decision-making processes and
from the implementation of the Baixa plan, thereby breaking a longstanding tradition of lo‐
cal autonomy in planning and taxation matters. The institutional makeup of the reconstruc‐
tion process evolved as the pragmatics of the situation dictated, with two complementary
bodies emerging: The first was the Lisbon Neighbourhoods Inspectorate as the civil defence
responder in 12 neighbourhoods city-wide. This agency was also instrumental in clearing
debris, removing and burying bodies, executing surveys and re-allocating land. The second
was the Public Works Department which was formed to implement the plan, and projects
including public spaces and new buildings. The technical team, comprising of army officers
in the civil administrative hierarchy, originated at the Lisbon Public Works Draughting Of‐
fice (Casa do Risco da Obras Públicas) which later became the Public Works Department. This
reduced, focused and disciplined chain-of-command, facilitated the absolute control re‐
quired for such sweeping changes to the urban space configuration and the resulting shift in
political and economic hegemony.
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The first order of business was the creation of the public realm, with new streets, squares
and gardens. Public health was foregrounded with upgraded sanitary infrastructure, water
supply and transport systems given priority. The construction of essential public buildings
for trade and business continuity such as the Customs Building in Praça do Comércio was
also critical as they served an influential special-interest group. Reconstruction took roughly
until 1807 to complete, ironically coinciding with the royal family’s flight to Brazil as Napo‐
leon’s troops massed on the border during the Peninsular Wars.
10. Urban design opportunities
A pamphlet at the time of the 1755 disaster optimistically stated that ‘Lisbon could not have
suffered a more fortunate tragedy’, indicating the potential the populace saw in the recon‐
struction process [25]. A major aspect of this fortune clustered around the implementation of
a good example of urban design, one that was ground-breaking for its time and which still
ranks as outstanding. The plan proceeded with a new gridded layout for the Baixa quarter,
based on the disaster and re-planning precedents of the fires in London and Rennes, and the
earthquake in Catania and planning precedents such as the 1620, 1673 and 1714 extensions
to Turin [26]. Among precedents for the Baixa Plan were Wren's 1666 plan for London (new
street alignments and property subdivision), new Turin (the regularised geometry of public
space and city blocks) and the Place Royale, Place Vendôme and the Royal Palace at Bor‐
deaux (the continuous articulated facades, marked entry points and arcaded bases of the
buildings which framed the public space) [27]. It represented a successful example of con‐
temporary urban disaster and urban design knowledge of in 18th century Europe.
The Terreiro do Paço was reconstructed and renamed the Praça do Comércio (Figure 5).
Rubble from the earthquake was recycled (eliminating the disposal problem) and an area
of land equal in size to the original square was reclaimed, extending the urban platform
into  the  Tagus.  The  reconstruction  of  Lisbon  presented  an  opportunity  to  integrate  the
waterfront square into the urban fabric. The new monumentally scaled square used sym‐
metry and architecture to integrate a complex of buildings embracing the space into the
urban fold, and created a powerful central axis penetrating into the city behind via Rua
Augusta,  thereby  linking  the  square  to  the  Rossio  (Lisbon's  other  principal  square)  be‐
yond.  Pombal’s  project  redressed the  problems that  had beset  the  Terreiro  as  an urban
square.  Certainly the architectural  and urban legibility  of  the square was enhanced,  the
buildings were better scaled to city blocks and there was more permeability to the Baixa,
with vistas  along Rua da Prata,  Rua Augusta and Rua do Ouro.  However,  the authori‐
tarian method of delivery required the subordination of individual property rights to the
public  interest,  with  new  development  and  construction  precisely  defined  within  the
strict constraints of the plan. The effect was also to subordinate architecture to urban de‐
sign,  with  exacting  and  specific  controls  placed  on  building  envelopes,  construction
methods, uses, appearance and materials.
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Figure 5. Praça do Comércio [Susana Pereira] 2011
The following section discusses urban design initiatives arising from a series of devastating
earthquakes in the new world city of Christchurch, New Zealand and compares them to the
18th century event in Portugal. Two years after the earthquakes, urban design strategies to
rebuild the broken city have been formulated but are not yet implemented.
11. Christchurch 2010 and 2011
Christchurch was planned in the mid-19th  century as the last Wakefield settlement to be
established by a  private  colonization enterprise  called the  New Zealand Company.  The
company was involved in the establishment of six urban centres in New Zealand: Well‐
ington  [1839]  Wanganui  [1840],  Nelson  [1841],  New  Plymouth  [1842],  Dunedin  [1848]
and Christchurch [1850].  The New Zealand Company brought  more than 9,000  hopeful
settlers to New Zealand up until 1843 [28], with each of the towns achieving numbers of
between 1000  and 4000 in  the  first  years  of  settlement.  Christchurch was  sponsored by
the Church of  England and aspired to recreate a stable agrarian,  hierarchical  society on
fertile land, between the Pacific coast  and the Southern Alps on terrain purchased from
the local  Ngai Tahu tribe.  A rectangular grid was surveyed onto flat  swampy land and
adjusted  where  necessary  to  accommodate  the  Avon/Otakaro  River,  which  meandered
across  the  site.  The  diagram  of  the  city  incorporated  the  grid,  the  river,  two  diagonal
roads  registering  the  principal  transport  routes  to  the  port  of  Lyttelton  and  the  main
road north,  a  cross-shaped central  square  (where  a  cathedral  was  later  built),  a  market
adjacent to the Avon River, two asymmetrical peripheral squares, and parklands provid‐
ing generous  and varied public  and recreational  space.  In  June  2010  the  city  was  New
Zealand’s second largest, with a population of 376,700.
12. Events
In the early morning of Sunday the 4th of September 2010 a magnitude 7.1 earthquake locat‐
ed 40 km west of Christchurch on an east-west fault, not previously identified, struck the
city. The fortuitous timing of the event explains the lack of fatalities but there was wide‐
spread damage to unreinforced masonry (URM) structures [walls and chimneys] in Christ‐
church and surrounding towns. Nineteenth century URM shop fronts collapsed into main
thoroughfares in the CBD, and there was widespread liquefaction to eastern suburbs’ resi‐
Learning from Lisbon: Contemporary Cities in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/53635
169
dential areas close to rivers. This earthquake triggered a series of aftershocks that moved
progressively closer to the city, culminating in a shallow, 5km deep, M 6.3 earthquake on
February 22, 2011 (Figure 6) centred at Lyttelton. This too occurred on an unidentified fault.
This second major event resulted in 181 deaths, with more than half of these occurring in the
collapse of the Canterbury Television Building. This earthquake caused further significant
damage and collapse to URM structures in the CBD, more liquefaction to eastern suburbs’
residential areas close to rivers and rock falls and landslides to the south and southeast. The
result is that between 50% and 70% of buildings in the CBD are likely to be condemned for
demolition with the discovery that many structures are out of vertical axis alignment due to
differential settlement and the realization that the repair of others is uneconomic.
Figure 6. A 6.3 magnitude earthquake strikes Christchurch on February 22nd 2011 [Gillian Needham]
The civil defence response was immediate, with international urban search and rescue terms
arriving from nations such as Australia and Japan to relieve local emergency services. Emer‐
gency response centres were swiftly established in parks, and sports and community build‐
ings, with temporary accommodation provision in the form of tents, caravans, and
prefabricated houses deployed by the Department of Housing and Construction. The entire
CBD was cordoned off and placed under police and army jurisdiction for an extended peri‐
od, leaving many businesses without access to their premises. The slow and uneven process
of insurance compensation has led to businesses relocating to other centres in New Zealand
or locally to the western edge of the city close to the airport. The entertainment centre of the
city has re-established itself in the west along Riccarton Road. With more than half of Christ‐
church’s listed heritage buildings (250) located in the CBD, the city’s patrimony has been
particularly hard hit with more than 100 demolitions to date. The iconic Anglican Cathedral,
the Catholic Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament and the Canterbury Provincial buildings
suffered significant damage (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Canterbury provincial buildings post-earthquake [Diane Brand] 2011
13. Recovery
After the second earthquake it was clear that existing central and local government agencies
were not equipped to facilitate recovery operations, and The Canterbury Earthquake Recov‐
ery Authority (CERA) was formed on March 29, 2011 as a special government agency for the
co-ordination of the recovery and rebuilding activities in Canterbury. The Canterbury Earth‐
quake Recovery Act [29] gave unparalleled (in New Zealand terms) authoritarian powers to
the Minister of Earthquake Recovery, The Right Honourable Gerry Brownlee, although in
practice the powers have been exercised only with the agreement of the cabinet (the govern‐
ment’s executive level ministerial group). In particular the CER Act allows a recovery plan
approved by the minister to override the requirements of New Zealand planning legislation
frameworks embodied in the Resource Management Act, the Conservation and Reserves
Acts and large parts of the Local Government Act (although not the funding provisions, and
the Land Transport Act).
The government’s response to the Canterbury earthquakes occurred in an environment of
mistrust between national and local government, characterised by the dissolution of the re‐
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gional council, Environment Canterbury, in March 2010, and the quite different leadership
styles of the mayor and the minister. Part of the reason for the distrust lay in the different
underlying political philosophies, with the ruling national government espousing a ‘shrink‐
ing government’ position together with the sales of government assets as a means of reduc‐
ing the national deficit. In contrast, local government in general, and in particular the
Christchurch City Council (CCC) supported maintaining the level of local government serv‐
ices as a minimum, with the CCC pursuing a clear position of holding onto city assets in
city-owned holding companies and using these to generate income or reduce tax liabilities.
In 2011, the government introduced an amendment to the Local Government Act aimed spe‐
cifically at limiting the services local governments could provide and the levels of rate in‐
creases they could introduce. The CER Act specifically excluded the minister from making
changes to the funding provisions of the Local Government Act and there have been con‐
tinuing discussions about the allocation of costs between national and local government
ranging from the emergency response costs to repair and rebuilding costs. The national gov‐
ernment has clearly stated on a number of occasions that it believes that the CCC should sell
some of its assets to fund the recovery bill.
The  CER Act  established a  new government  agency to  oversee  the  recovery  of  Canter‐
bury and the government’s  investment in the rebuilding of  Christchurch.  The act  speci‐
fies  that  the  minister  can  direct  the  city  council,  but  does  not  clearly  establish  the
respective roles of the organisations,  or create any direct  organisational links or lines of
management  apart  from  general  requirements  to  consult.  The  newness  of  the  govern‐
ment agency CERA, coupled with the pre-existing responsibilities of the council,  has led
to a lack of clarity about their respective roles, with duplication happening at a number
of levels between the two organisations.
The CER Act specifically required the CCC to develop a draft recovery plan for the central
city in nine months for the minister’s approval, including public consultation. Planning for
the rest of the Christchurch metropolitan area was the responsibility of CERA. The Draft
Central City Plan (CCP)[30] was completed in eight months, however the minister spent a
further seven months reviewing it. When the minister received the draft he endorsed the vi‐
sion contained in the first volume, with the exception of the proposed transport changes, but
he set aside the proposed regulations for further investigation [31]. The ‘blueprint’ plan [32],
subsequently approved by the minister, broadly adopted the range of major infrastructure
projects proposed in the Draft CCP and retained the majority of the proposed regulations
including the reduced height limits. The major changes from the Draft CCP was the removal
of the regulations requiring improved environmental performance from buildings (the
BASE assessment developed with the NZ Green Building Council), the removal of the finan‐
cial incentives for rebuilding proposed by the council and the removal of the majority of the
transport provisions pending further investigation.
The Canterbury earthquakes resulted in extensive land damage and areas of liquefaction,
particularly in the eastern part of the city (Figure 8). The resulting changes in elevation in‐
cluded some areas in the Port Hills rising by up to 500 millimetres while areas around the
estuary and Avon River subsided by more than 500 millimetres (Figure 9). In extensive areas
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the cost of land remediation, flood protection and/or the restoration of services made it un‐
economic to rebuild on the terrain. The government assessed all residential land in Christ‐
church and the surrounding towns based on extensive geotechnical studies and eventually
classified them as either ‘green’ (fit to rebuild) or ‘red’ (unfit to rebuild). Subsequently, the
government has set about purchasing more than 6,000 houses in the residential red zone
based on the 2009 rateable valuations. The houses are generally either clustered in low lying
areas around the Avon River and Estuary or vulnerable to rock fall in the Port Hills.
Figure 8. Liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (2011) New Zealand Aerial Mapping Ltd for LINZ
The retreat of settlement along the Avon River and Estuary in Christchurch has provided a
microcosm of the kinds of issues likely to be faced by many coastal cities worldwide, if sea
level rises predicted over the next century occur [33]. The model of strategic retreat, from
vulnerable areas may become relevant in many other areas. While the Christchurch model
has addressed the issues of strategic retreat and attempted to manage the economic impact
on residents, no attempt has been made to address the impacts at a community level. How‐
ever, a map showing the areas where ‘red zoners’ have relocated reveals a scattered pattern
determined by the prices and availability of houses, rather than any managed attempt to re‐
locate communities.
The CER Act facilitated the immediate use of earthquake rubble for reclamation work to ex‐
tend the container port at Lyttelton. This would have been difficult and protracted under the
RMA. The port is one of the key economic drivers for the Canterbury economy, and the port
extension reflects the changing scale and technologies of port logisitics. The CER Act has al‐
so been used to fast-track residential subdivisions, thereby short circuiting the currently pro‐
tracted consent and environment court processes. The intention has been to free up
residential land so that people who have been displaced by the earthquakes, and workers
arriving in Christchurch to assist with the rebuild can be adequately housed. In doing so,
the minister has confirmed the overall urban form proposed in the Greater Christchurch Ur‐
Learning from Lisbon: Contemporary Cities in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/53635
173
ban Development Strategy which sets out urban limits, greenfield residential areas and
housing densities, targets for intensification, urban design outcomes and key transport corri‐
dors (although these measures are currently being challenged through the courts). The need
to dispose of a huge quantity of rubble in a very short timeframe, and to expedite the provi‐
sion of new housing stock to replace that damaged and destroyed are common issues for
cities struck by earthquakes. Both Lisbon and Christchurch used authoritarian powers to ad‐
dress these issues in a timely and economically beneficial manner.
Figure 9. Lidar Map of Christchurch showing ground level changes (2010) COMET
14. Compensation
After  a  wave  of  earthquakes  that  plagued  New  Zealand  between  1929  and  1942  (the
worst  of  which was the M7.8 Hawkes Bay earthquake of 1931 which completely devas‐
tated  the  cities  of  Napier  and  Hastings),  the  Labour  Government  created  the  Earth‐
quake and War Damage Commission. The commission eventually insured all  residential
properties,  including  the  land  (up  to  $100,000  for  buildings  and  $20,000  for  contents)
against  damage from natural  disasters  [34].  Commercial  property  must  be  privately  in‐
sured. In early 2010,  the EQC had reserves of NZD 5.6 billion backed by a government
guarantee. However the total insurance estimate for the Christchurch earthquakes is up‐
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wards of  NZD 30  billion  [35]  and represents  the  worst  natural  disaster  in  a  developed
nation  relative  to  size  of  economy.  Private  insurance  fared  no  better,  with  the  market
dominated  by  only  5  principal  providers,  several  of  whom  have  struggled  to  pay  out
claims without government assistance.  The compensation for damage is  an on-going sa‐
ga  of  bureaucratic  complexity,  delays  and individual  suffering  which  has  been  exhaus‐
tively  documented  by  the  nation’s  media.  Policy  neglect  had  contributed  to  the
underinsurance of the majority of New Zealand homes, with EQC covering a quarter of
the average value of  a  New Zealand home,  and maximum premiums still  at  their  1973
level  of  NZD 67.50 per annum in spite  of  advice to increase these in 2008.  A premium
for  land  insurance  had  never  been  charged,  but  this  type  of  damage  turned  out  to  be
the most  expensive.  While  the annual  EQC premiums were raised in the immediate af‐
termath of  the earthquakes,  policy revision in the insurance sector is  still  under consid‐
eration.  Discussions  include  the  introduction  of  land  insurance,  better  processes  of
alignment  between land use decision making in  territorial  local  authorities  and disaster
insurance agencies,  and the level of future risk-sharing between EQC and private insur‐
ers [36].
15. Experience and expertise
Local government manager Warwick Isaac, who was overseeing the demolition of buildings
in Christchurch, was appointed to lead the Central Christchurch Development Unit (CCDU)
which is tasked with leading the rebuilding of the central city. Dubbed ‘the demolition
man’, a Tom Scott cartoon has him lamenting “If I had known you were going to put me in
charge of the rebuild Minister I wouldn’t have pulled so much down.” Both the council’s
Draft Central City Plan and the 100-day Blueprint subsequently produced by the CCDU
were prepared by multidisciplinary teams led by urban designers. Although the approaches
were fundamentally different, with a community-led bottom-up process for the Draft Cen‐
tral City Plan and a technocratic top down ‘masterplan’ in the Blueprint, both documents
were ‘design-led’ in that they used design as the key method of developing the plans with
built environment professionals (urban designers, landscape architects, architects) holding
the key leadership roles responsible for developing plan content.
The Draft Central City Plan was developed by a multidisciplinary in-house team of council
staff that included seconded team members from national and international consultancies
including Gehl Architects from Copenhagen. Hugh Nicholson, the Principal Urban Designer
at the Christchurch City Council, was responsible for delivering the content of the plan. The
team included urban designers, architects, landscape architects, engineers, economists, plan‐
ners, community advisers, communication specialists, sustainability advisers and recreation
and open space planners.
The 100-day Blueprint was prepared by a consortium of design companies led by Boffa Mis‐
kell, a local company specialising in landscape architecture, urban design and landscape
planning. The consortium included local architects Warren and Mahoney and Sheppard and
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Rout as well as specialist convention centre and stadium designers. The team was led by
landscape architects Don Miskell and Rachel De Lambert and urban designer Marc Bailey.
16. Planning
Within three months of  the February earthquake,  an extensive public  consultation exer‐
cise  was  undertaken  with  the  people  of  Christchurch  to  help  shape  the  future  plan  of
the  devastated  city.  The  website  shareanidea.org.nz  generated  58,000  hits  and  engaged
the  public  in  four  key  areas:  move  (transportation),  market  (business),  space  (public
place  and  recreation)  and  life  (mixed  uses),  across  traditional  and  social  media  net‐
works.  This  was  followed by an interactive  expo,  10  community  workshops,  100  stake‐
holder  meetings  and  a  professional  competition  for  5  selected  sites.  An  unprecedented
level  of  public  participation generated 106,000 ideas over six weeks and these informed
the development of the Draft Central City Plan.
One  of  the  firm  assumptions  underlying  the  Draft  Central  City  Plan  was  the  mainte‐
nance  of  the  existing  street  and  land  ownership  patterns.  In  part  this  recognised  the
strong urban form provided by the existing grid and its  heritage values.  In part  it  was
in  response  to  initial  estimates  that  suggested  50%  of  the  buildings  in  the  commercial
core  might  be  demolished  (subsequently  this  looks  to  be  greater  than  60%).  This  im‐
plied  that  there  was  still  a  substantial  residual  value  in  the  remaining  buildings  and
services  which the  city  could not  afford to  lose.  In  terms of  broad urban design objec‐
tives,  both the draft  CCP and the Blueprint  set  out  to provide an enhanced network of
green open spaces  based around the  Papa o  Otakaro (Avon River  Park)  and Cathedral
Square,  to  rebuild  a  more  compact  intensive  low-rise  commercial  core,  to  increase  the
number and density of  inner-city residents,  and to promote mixed-use developments in
areas surrounding the core. The plan also proposed more sustainable transportation sys‐
tems, including a light-rail system from the university to the CBD, that would eventual‐
ly  connect  into  a  regional  rail  network  and  a  grid  of  cycle-ways.  The  redevelopment
clustered around a  set  of  core  projects  seeded by government,  which were  designed to
attract  investment  and rebuilding  in  the  CBD and these  included a  greening  of  Cathe‐
dral Square, a sports hub, a convention centre, a central library and a hospital campus.
One of the more controversial urban design proposals in the Draft CCP was a reduction in
height limits to 28 metres or seven stories. Christchurch was the first major Australasian city
to propose a low-rise urban form, moving away from the modernist podium and tower
model of development. The reasons for this were partly the high level of community sup‐
port for low-rise buildings and their desire to create a more human-scale environment with
better environmental conditions, including improved sunlight access and reduced wind fun‐
nelling. Additionally, economic modelling indicated that due to the increased foundation
and structural costs required to build higher than six to seven storeys, the most economical‐
ly viable built-form with the highest rate of financial return was in this height range. The
final reason was to address the oversupply of commercial land in the core, by rebuilding a
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more consistent intensity of development over the area of the core, avoiding the spikes of
oversupply and undersupply provided by the tower model. There was a strong backlash
from the business community against the proposed height limits and this was one of the
provisions that the national government set aside when it reviewed the Draft CCP. However
at the end of the review, they reconfirmed the height limits based primarily on the economic
impact assessment and the land supply issues.
Figure 10. The CCUP Blueprint (2012) CCUP
The Draft CCP proposed using built-form restrictions to further promote a compact com‐
mercial core, with a higher intensity of development through the use of incentives and by
limiting development potential outside the core. The Blueprint adopted a far more interven‐
tionist approach by establishing a ‘green frame’ (reinstating nineteenth century parklands)
and compulsorily acquiring large areas of land surrounding the core. The long-term future
of the proposed frame is not entirely clear. Some parts of it appear to be intended as perma‐
nent open spaces, some parts such as the health precinct are earmarked for campus-style
commercial development, while other parts appear to form a potential land bank for release
once land in the core has been fully developed.
In summary, the Draft CCP adopted a multifaceted approach to recovery that incorporated
a wider range of projects and implementation tools. The vision balanced incentives and reg‐
ulation to deliver major catalyst and public space projects, alongside sustainability, housing,
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arts and transport projects. The blueprint focuses more deliberately on national government
priorities, providing a regulated vision embodied in a range of catalyst projects that involve
rebuilding critical public and economic infrastructure such as the hospital and the conven‐
tion centre. At the second anniversary of the first earthquake, the city has started to rebuild
with 1000 building consents in the past 12 months. Processes are being put in place by
CCUP to fast track significant projects through an urban design board process while the
CCC Urban Design Panel is doubling in size to cater for the anticipated increasing volume
of resource consent applications.
17. Conclusion
Events in Lisbon and Christchurch stand apart in chronology, severity and extent, recovery
management, and design outcome, but have sufficient in common to draw some interesting
and relevant conclusions to 21st century disaster-response strategies. Prime amongst these is
the use of urban design as a revitalisation mechanism, as it is a natural aspiration to want to
rebuild a devastated metropolis anew, correcting the mistakes of the past by implementing
new and state-of-the-art practices to envision a better city.
Lisbon suffered not only a cataclysmic earthquake but also a devastating tsunami and fire.
Fortunately for Christchurch the latter two stressors were absent, and 250 years of improved
planning, seismic and fire engineering performance, reduced the relative death toll from
building collapse while generous provision of public space allowed the population to escape
to safer areas. Christchurch, in achieving this high level of technical preparedness, is much
indebted to Lisbon which pioneered many contemporary post-earthquake response strat‐
egies. Two hundred and fifty years before the terms resilience or sustainability entered the
built environment lexicon, their guiding principles were applied in Lisbon. Pombal’s engi‐
neers made the decision to rebuild in the same location, but not before investigating six al‐
ternative sites and researching the technical failures that led to the high death toll. In so
doing they were embedding in the plan the future sustainability of the city and built in resil‐
ience for future seismic events, not only for themselves but also for others who chose to fol‐
low their example.
The civil defence emergency response was, for the first time in history, an international one,
with Portugal’s trading partners stepping in to assist. The necessary revenue for recovery
was raised via import taxes levied by local businesses. Exploitative behaviours were cur‐
tailed by punishing looters, freezing rents and the price of materials. The immediate survey‐
ing and demolition of the area reduced the territory to a uniform and indisputable condition
in terms of future claims. Prior to any rebuilding, a post-disaster analysis was conducted to
establish which buildings had survived and why. These investigations led to a number of
technical innovations that required a new formal and technical building typology. This sim‐
ple and elegant solution to rebuild the city relied on three crucial pillars: the complete dem‐
olition of the devastated Baixa, the re-drawing of property lines, and an urban design plan
that integrated these technical provisions into a best-practice vision (based on solid interna‐
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tional precedent) for a commercial rather than an institutional centre for Lisbon. The imple‐
mentation of these strategies was only possible due to the authoritarian nature of the
governance system at the time, and an emergency response which delivered this power uni‐
laterally into the hands of the Minister of State.
A similar approach is clearly not possible or appropriate in a modern democracy, although
the potential exists and was contemplated within the New Zealand legislation introduced to
affect recovery plans in Christchurch. The national government has committed substantial
leadership resources and legislative support to the recovery of Christchurch and the Canter‐
bury region. Of particular note has been the strategic land use withdrawal from the residen‐
tial red zone, the on-going demolition of dangerous buildings, and the proposed major
infrastructure and facilities as catalyst projects. The authoritarian powers provided through
the CER Act have enabled these initiatives to occur with the minimum of delay or inappro‐
priate process, although some delays have occurred due to the lack of clarity about the re‐
spective roles of the council and CERA. The Draft CCP proposed an integrated plan for the
central city, while the blueprint approved by the minister focuses on rebuilding the major
infrastructure and facilities and leaves out much of the 'glue' - the smaller scale projects that
hold the big moves together. The absence of urban residential typologies or social housing
to accommodate earthquake victims from the list of prioritised projects, overlooks the ca‐
pacity and necessity of embedding these in the plan as community or capital investment op‐
portunities in the way they were in the Lisbon plan. The council currently intends to
continue with a number of these smaller projects in tandem, so the end outcome may well
be the same albeit encapsulated in two plans rather than one. The major omission of the ma‐
jority of the transport provisions is the subject of a further study.
The Draft CCP and the approved blueprint have both been led by urban designers and
shaped by urban design propositions, in particular a low-rise, more intensively developed
city based on economic factors with high quality green and public spaces shaped for people.
The extent to which they can replicate the success of the Lisbon reconstruction is at least in
part subject to international economic forces and remains to be seen. Equally important is
the clarity developed around future urban design controls. While these exist in the Draft
CCP, the minister has side-stepped council involvement in consent processes and set up a
new consent authority to oversee central-city consents, with one representative each from
the council, CERA and Ngai Tahu, (with no articulated formal role for Christchurch City Ur‐
ban Design Panel). This body has a mandated consent turnaround of 5 working days as
compared to the usual 20- to 85-day timeframe (depending on levels of compliance).
The top-down process enacted in the Lisbon earthquake or more recently the Kyoto earth‐
quake, and the bottom-up process followed after Hurricane Katrina, sit at either extreme of
the continuum of possible response management strategies to natural disasters. A balance
between these extremes is more feasible, the balance depending on the socio-cultural and
economic context and the governance systems in place at the time of the crisis.
Communication Technologies have had a major impact on response capability in the inter‐
vening centuries between Lisbon and Christchurch. Tsunami early warning systems and in‐
ternational media networks give instant alerts of impending disasters allowing preparation
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or evacuation. Cell phone networks, satellite communications and GPS tracking and posi‐
tioning technologies contribute to more effective search and rescue operations. Collective
media and social network platforms pressure reconstruction authorities to deliver on their
promises in a timely manner. The internet collapses the time required for widespread public
consultation leading to more effective community buy-in into new urban proposals.
In Christchurch, the lack of alternative design proposals from official sources has been a re‐
sponse to the short timeframes imposed by the government. This is less concerning or neces‐
sary given the wide consultation undertaken to reach the plan outcome. Again in spite of
the 250-year separation and with different professional actors, Lisbon and Christchurch had
good levels of technical expertise available to generate an urban design-led reconstruction
effort using current contemporary urban theory around sustainability and resilience plan‐
ning in combination with deep local knowledge.
The technical planning and architectural detail is not yet present in the Christchurch plan
and will be managed by planning consent processes that have not yet been well defined. Lis‐
bon provides an excellent model for reinventing a modern local urban type (a mixed-use,
low-rise, multi-tenancy, structurally sound and fire-protected building) and designing an
urban block morphology that reflects a historical vernacular. This will be the fabric that
weaves the plan framework and the demonstration projects into a real city.
New Zealand government agencies in charge of engineering, building and construction
standards have not yet integrated the lessons from the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes into up‐
graded performance codes. As a nation located on a chain of islands on the Pacific ‘ring of
fire’, uptake of resilience strategies like those in enlightenment Portugal must encompass
flexible governance systems, high-level technical expertise in national, regional and urban
planning sectors, and innovative architectural, communications, engineering and material
technologies. This in combination with communities helping themselves is the best insur‐
ance against future calamity.
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